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Kant on Duties to Animals
Nelson Potter
According to Kant we human beings are finite rational beings, who also have an
animal nature. Kant occasionally speculates that perhaps on other planets there
may be quite different sorts of finite rational animals. But of course we have no
specific knowledge of any such. Given that fact, all of our duties are duties to
other human beings. We can have no duties to God because he is not an object of
possible experience. There are no human beings such that they have only duties
and no rights - they would be slaves or serfs. And the apparent duties that we have
to abstain from cruel treatment of (nonhuman) animals are, it turns out, not direct
duties to such animals, but duties to ourselves, and merely indirect duties with
regard to animals.
"Duties to animals" in the Kantian context is an issue about the scope of moral-
i~y. Does our "moral community" include non-human animals or not? Kant's ver-
sI~n ~f the moral community seems to be the kingdom of ends, and it is clear that
thIS kingdom includes only finite rational beings like you or me, dear reader. There
are arguably two versions of the issue of duties to animals: the legal and the ethi-
cal. Perhaps there were no laws in Kant's day against cruelty to animals, but such
laws since Kant's day have been widespread at least among European and Ameri-
can societies for well over a century. The ethical question would ask whether we
h.ave ethical duties to abstain from cruelty to animals (apart from any legal provi-
SIOns) for which we should be moved to action by inner moral motivation. Such
dul' I' I . tIes would be analogous to the ethical duties we have that under Ie aws agams
:sault or theft, or they could be analogous to the imperfe~t duties we. have ~o pro-
ote the welfare of others and render assistance to others m need, dutIes WhICh are
not enforced by laws. But there would be no direct duties to animals, either legal
or ethical, if animals were outside the scope of morality. We will return to these
two elements of duties to animals at a later point.
The answers to such questions of the scope of morality must b~ a part ~f our
Un?erstanding of Kant's practical philosophy, alongside other such Issues as Impu-
tatIon, freedom, and criminal punishment that have been of concern to Professor
Hru~chka in his many contributions to understanding that philosophy, and more
partICUlarly Kant's philosophy of law.
When Kant states his claim about our having only indirect duties to ani.mals, he
makes similar statements about our having indirect duties also to beauty 10 plants
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and lifeless nature, neither of which should be wantonly destroyed. But in ,this
paper I will confine my attention to his views on animals, for they raise qu~St1O~S
that plants or lifeless beauty do not. And to further focus our attention, I wIll dis-
cuss Kant's duties to animals only in relation to what I'll call paradigm an~mals,
i.e., animals to whom we surely have duties, if we have duties to any ammals.
Most or all invertebrates would be excluded as non-paradigm, because they do not
have nervous systems well enough integrated to undergo pain and suffering in the
way that is all too familiar to us humans. Paradigm animals will be larger, more
familiar animals, mostly mammals, whom we humans often deal with or make use
of in one way or another: dogs, cats, cattle, horses, oxen, rabbits, mink, perhaps
chickens, and so forth. If we have duties to any animals, we have duties to such as
them, it seems reasonable to say, and the main extension of scope of duties w~ are
interested in here is the extension from humans to these most promising ammal
candidates for being bearers of such rights. How far we might seek to exten.d
duties to animals beyond these animal paradigms is a complicated topic that IS
beyond the scope of this paper.
There is a further related complication I want to declare beyond the scope ,of
this paper. There are certain non-human animals who are similar enough and m-
deed in an evolutionary sense close enough to us to raise questions about whether
they might be in some significant way rational beings. Think of chimpanzees,
bonobos, or perhaps dolphins, whales, or gorillas. It is sometimes argued that ?e-
cause some of these creatures are so similar to human beings, the constnunts
against scientific experiments upon human subjects should also be applied to them,
Or to take such even more difficult hypothetical cases about which our knowle~ge
is limited: what should we say about our ethical relations with the various extmct
, f . deed have
speCIes a Homo erectus or Homo neanderthalis? Such creatures may III ,
been semi-human, and limited in their capabilities in the way racists used to claUD
that humans of other races were. Such creatures would have been similar enough
to us humans to raise difficult questions about where to draw a line distinguishing
between human and nonhuman, and yet they would be more different from us than
any individual Homo sapiens.
This whole issue of duties to animals might seem like a peripheral and un!mpor-
tant question for Kant's ethical theory. Kant himself only briefly and occaslOnally
alludes to it. And there is not much substantive nonnative disagreement between
Kant and moderate opponents of cruel treatment of animals. Kant thinks it is wrong
I . fl" , 't' n thatwanton y to m lCt pam on alllmals. Some might say that given Kant's pOSI lO
such duties are only indirect, it will not be possible for him finally to arrive at an
adequately robust set of norms in opposition to animal cruelty. I have my doubts
about this; that is, it seems to me that one might develop an adequately robust,th~O­
ry ~f opposition to animal cruelty based only on indirect duties, But again thiS IS a
tOPiC that we will put to one side for the purposes of the present paper.
Kant tells us that he thinks it is all right to raise animals for meat, and to ~se
them for labor (drawing plows or wagons). He expresses his doubts about infhct-
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ing experiments on animals, but I suspect this is because such experiments as he
heard of were idle and purposeless, and if this is correct then we should not be
confident that he would oppose modem medical experiments generally. My own
view is that it is morally acceptable to raise animals for human consumption - at
least so far as any duties to such animals are concerned, provided they are raised in
humane conditions and put to death as quickly and painlessly as possible. So I
count myself as a moderate along with Kant on this issue. According to such a
view there are duties to animals, and surely direct duties, but they are not broad
enough to force us to be moral vegetarians, at least so long as we can have access
to humanely raised and slaughtered meat. I call such a view "moderate," placing it
between strontg animal rights views that ground opposition to the use of slaugh-
tered animals for their meat or other uses, and opposition to much experimentation
using animals, and, on the other side, the Cartesian tradition, which regards ani-
mals as machines incapapble of the experience of pain. Another basis for a duty of
moral vegetarianism that is unrelated to the moral status of animals may be that it
is unjustifiably extravagant to feed grain and other foods to meat animals that
might directly nourish humans who are in want of nutrition, because the luxury of
some humans eating meat may deprive others of needed nutrition. But I mention
these issues only to put them aside here, after having used them to explain what I
mean by Kant's taking a moderate position on ethical treatment of animals.
The Kantian main texts that I wish to consider are from his Metaplzysics of
Morals. The first comes from the introduction to the first part of that work, the
Reclztslehre. Kant offers a "Division in accordance with the relation of the subject
imposing Obligation to the subject put under obligation." [MS, VI: 241. Notes to
Kant's text will be given as references to the volume and page of Kants gesam-
melte Schrijten, herausgegeben von der Koniglich PreuBischen Akademie der Wis-
senschaften, Berlin, 1907 and later. MS abbreviates Metaplzysik der Sitten. Most
translations include this standard pagination. The reference later to Kant's Critique
of Pure Reason will follow the standard practice of indicating the pagination from
the first (A) and second (B) editions.] Within the Reclztslehre rights and duties will
be symmetrical because we are considering only perfect external duties to others.
There are no imperfect duties not mirrored by a right, of the sort that are to be
found in its second part, the Tugendlelzre.
Kant tells us that first, the relation of rights of human beings towar~ those ~ho
have neither rights nor duties has no members because "these are b,:lllg~ lackmg
reason, which can neither bind us nor by which we can be bound. ThIs empt.y
Classification is where Kant would put the moral relation between humans ~nd am-
mals. Also lacking in members, thirdly, would be the rights of human belllgs to-
ward beings that have only duties but no rights," for these would be humans
"Without personality (serfs slaves)" and there are no such. And, fourthly, also
empty is the classification' of rights' humans have toward a being that has only
rights but no duties (God)." This leaves as the only relation havi~g members, the
seCond, the relation of human beings towards beings that have nghts as well as
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duties," Le., the relations between human and human. [MS, VI: 241] So, within
Recht there are no unsymmetrical relations. According to the alternative to Kant's
views on this matter that we want to present and consider in this paper, nonhuman
paradigm animals are beings that would have rights but not duties, and so would
fall in Kant's first or fourth division. We wrong a dog or a horse if we beat it~ it has
a right not to be beaten because it suffers and feels pain from such treatment. But
nonhuman animals have no duties because, as Kant says, they lack reason. ACco~­
ing to what has just been said, then, the relation of humans to animals is a relatlon
to a being who has no duties, but only rights. That description Kant supposes ~p­
plies to God, in division (4), and this would be because God is above duty, W.lth
that term's suggestion of a resisting inclination. We want to present and exarntne
an alternative view, against Kant, that animals would have rights because they ~an
suffer, but no duties because they lack the rational capabilities for such; according
to this view we might say they are below duty. I am ready to agree with Kant that
we have (4) no duties to God because he is not a possible object of experience, and
that (3) there would be no human beings who would be correctly regarded as lack-
ing personality, that is, slaves or serfs. However, classification (3) is of interest
because it might be thought to apply to not fully functional human beings such as
the profoundly retarded, the anacephalic, those in a permanent vegetative stat~,
those suffering from severe senile dementia in one of its forms, and so forth. This
is a group of individuals about which Kant otherwise has nothing to say. Conce~­
ing division (4) Kant elsewhere says [Religion, AK, VI: 99] that all duties consid-
ered from a religious point of view can be regarded as duties to God, but this fact
does not alter the content of such duties, which would still be moral relations of
human persons to human persons, falling under (2).
Our second main text is from his discussion of duties to oneself, a section en-
titled "On an amphiboly in moral concepts of reflection, taking what is a hum~
being's duty to himself for a duty to other beings." [MS, VI: 442] I quote at length.
A f I · b' (himselfs ar as reason a one can Judge, a human being has duties only to human ewgs
and others), since his duty to any subject is moral constraint by that subject'S will. lienee
the constraining (binding) subject must, first, be a person; and this person must, sec0nd.IY,
be given as an object of experience .... But from all our experience we know of nO being
other than a human being that would be capable of obligation (active or passive). A hu~an
be· h l" d 'f h thinkstng can t erelore have no duty to any beings other than human beings: an Ie.
he has such duties. it is because of an amphiboly in his concepts of reflection, and ~s
supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to himself. He is led to this misunderstand~ng
b . aki h' . B seIDey mist ng IS duty with regard to other beings for a duty to those beings. [da er .
Pflicht in Ansehung anderer Wesen flir Pflicht gegen diese Wesen verwechselt]. [MS. VI.
442. Compare Kant's discussion of "Amphibolies" in Critique ofPure Reason]
Now all duties to others also have an aspect of duties to oneself in Kant's view~
thus my obligation to act as a Good Samaritan is a duty to the person aided, but
~lso a duty to myself, that is, a duty to have sufficient respect for my own human-
Ity to fulfill this requirement of duty. [See MS, VI: 417, Section 2, where Kant
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makes this point, saying that without duties to oneself there could be no duties at
all.] We can have these duties that are only indirect to inanimate (perhaps beauti-
ful) nature, to plants, and to animals. As mentioned earlier, we'll here only consid-
er the case of duties to animals.
Kant explains that wanton destruction or hann to animals uproots the agent's
inner disposition that is important in his moral character, and adds that humans
may raise animals for meat or use them for work. He makes a distinction between
direct duties to animals, which we don't have, and indirect duties with regard to
animals, which we have. [MS, VI: 443. Also see MS, VI: 413]
The issues I wish to consider here have to do with the following difficulties: (1) It
seems COunterintuitive to say that duties to abstain from cruel treatment of animals
are not duties to them. For this reason we should prefer an account of such duties as
direct duties if one should be available. (2) More seriously, there are human beings
who are not rational beings: newborns, the demented, the severely retarded, the co-
matose, those in a permanent vegetative state, and so forth. Do we also only have
indirect duties to them? This is surely an unacceptable conclusion, and yet it seems
to be an implication of Kant's views concerning our duties to animals. I think many
would say that we have direct duties to such non-fully functioning human beings, as
part of what ought to be regarded as entailed by the Kantian idea of respect for
humanity. To say we have only indirect duties to such humans is to exclude them
from the kingdom of ends, or our moral community. This seems troubling. Duties
that are merely "with regard to" animals or low-functioning humans have almost an
accidental relation to such indirect objects. Such "with regard to" objects can
be almost anything possessing instrumental value and / or which possess beauty
- houses, hammers, fine china, mountains, horses, salmon, wild or cultivated flow-
ers, colorful stones, alarm clocks, or sports cars. In contrast, direct objects of duties
must have "sakes" _ preferences that are internal and important to the organism and
that have the potential of being expressed in its conative life and its behavior. For
ex~mple, an elderly human suffering from severe senile dementia, i~ he were an
o~Ject only of indirect duty would be such an object only for a vanety of w~at
mIght be termed non-intrinsic reasons: he is the father, grandfather. spouse or SIb-
ling of other humans, anyone who treats him with cruelty, contempt. utter dis-
r~g~rd, or hatred, would be arguably thereby influenced so to treat other (fully func-
honIng) members of the species similarly, and such actions would be wrong. Such
bad treatment would also have an adverse effect on the moral character of the
agent. These would be the only reasons for an agent's morally constraining her be-
havior toward such an individual. This seems to be an unacceptable view to have
tOwards a lOW-functioning human or a paradigm animals, even when it is adequate
to morally constrain an agent's behavior within an acceptable range.
~ow the duties we have to such partially functioning humans will be ~elative to
theIr interests, as is true with respect to all other individuals who ha~e ~ghts. The
comatose and the severely intellectually challenged are not interested In lIvely co~­
versation, though they may be interested in not being too hot or too cold or In
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satisfying their thirst. Even here sometimes we may wish to speak of what the
interests of such individuals would be if or when they were conscious; the coma-
tose person may not have conscious sensations of thirst, but he retains, argua,bly, at
least a hypothetical interest in not having his physiological functioning impaired or
, sted
even halted by a lack of water. When I am trying to sleep, I am also not m~ere
in lively conversation, though at other times I may be. My friend may despIse wes-
tern movies and love Wagnerian opera, while the opposite is true for me: In the
same way, we might urge that boredom is a serious issue with some expenme?tal
animals (apes) and not others, or that fear of death may not find exact correlatives
in most non-human animals, even our paradigms. All of these differences can
make a difference as we try to draw conclusions concerning what kinds of treat·
ment are appropriate or not for different individuals, human and nonhuman,
But in this paper we are not primarily concerned with such interest-relative dif-
ferences. For Kant's main point about the differences in our duties to other humans
(and ourselves) as opposed to nonhuman animals has nothing at least directly to~O
with such differences in interests, Surely Kant can completely agree that such tn-
terest-relevant differences in our duties to individuals, whether human or o,the~
wise, are fully correct and acceptable. Rather Kant's point is that only ratiOn
beings can possess rights and thus bind rational beings to having duties, or, as w~
might put it more loosely, only rational beings are members of the moral and leg f
community. The consequence is that nonhuman animals are beyond the pale 0
K t' d' d h h ." b' ts of indirectan Ian utles, an ence, as e says, only the "WIth regard to 0 ~ec
duties to ourselves.
We do need to discuss the problems this approach causes for different classes of
not fully functioning human beings. In the case of newborns, for example, we
might say that such are not presently functioning at the full human level but under
1 ' ,'/I Evennorma Clfcumstances of development we can have every hope that they}l-l .-
I , . ' ng aC-a s eepmg person IS for a period unconscious, and hence not fully funcUOll1
cording to human paradigms, or rational person paradigms, but there is every eX-
pectation that she will before long. The comatose person mayor may not recover,
but until all hope of recovery is gone for such a person she would still be the
b ' 'd'fficult
earer of nghts based on the possibility of such recovery. The more I h
groups of cases are those for which there is little or no hope of recovery of sue
normal human functioning. After a serious head injury or stroke a human may for
a time be very incompletely functioning, and it may take a long time correct1Yd:~
conclude that we should lose hope of recovery. Some think there is room for
bate about whether we should ever lose such hope completely, Such a losS of hope
is suggested by the phrase "permanent vegetative state" used to describe the state
some such persons are in. Again, this paper is not the place to discuss when if ever
we should abandon hope. I will simply assume that there are some individuals for
whom projecting such hopeful and beneficial changes is not at all reasonable, for
ex~mple. those in a permanently vegetative state, or advanced victims of Al~~
helmers. Such hopeless humans, as we might describe them. appear to be qUI
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comparable to nonhuman animals in their behavioral capacities, especially those
related to the possession of reason, and, it seems, should be treated in similar fash-
ion within Kantian ethical theory. And this would be a major problem for such a
theory, for we do not want to say that such human individuals should only be the
object of indirect duties, as Kant, it seems, would specify.
This is the major problem of scope that is raised by Kant's views on duties to
(nonhuman) animals. This view, it seems, must be extended to such hopeless
humans as the severely retarded, those in a permanent vegetative state, those who
are permanently comatose, irreversibly demented or senile, born anacephalic, and
so forth. We want to resist extending a view of merely indirect duties to such indi-
viduals.
This point is used in other contexts by animal rights proponents such as Peter
Singer and Tom Regan to argue for a more robust theory of animal rights. They
say that if We take seriously the common idea that those humans whose rational
functions in particular are quite limited are to be accorded full human rights, then
in consistency we must extend such rights also to nonhuman animals. The conclu-
sion with respect to both groups is that the classes of paradigm nonhuman animals
and of humans permanently incapable of rational functioning must be treated ethi-
cally in the same way. For people, Kantians or others, with what I've called moder-
ate views on animal rights this forces an unhappy choice: either greatly elevate the
appropriate level of moral rights for paradigm nonhuman animals, or drastically
lOwer the level of such rights accorded to humans permanently and seriously lack-
ing in rational function.
Kant never discusses the situation of hopeless humans, as we have called them,
and so, it seems, has no awareness of this unhappy dilemma, the problem see-
mingly implied by his views concerning our ethical duties to animals. It seems that
he should be reluctant to eliminate direct duties to nonfunctional humans. And
the logic of his explicit position that we have duties only to rational beings seems
deeply embedded in his ethical theory, and therefore it will likely not be easy to
revise in order to accommodate this present problem.
But even though such difficulties might be considerable. we certainly want to
consider the question: Might there not be a possible alternative account of duties to
animals within a broadly Kantian theory that would allow such duties to be direct
?uties, centrally and originally concerned with the welfare and avoidance of suffer-
109 for such nonhuman creatures?
Within Kant's ethical system, where would such duties arise? As we've seen,
Kant himself introduces his discussion of duties to animals within his discussion of
duties to oneself. Of course, a1l duties to oneself are ethical duties that fall in the
second half of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Tugendlehre, and would faU quite
outside the scope of any system of law or Recht. So if we accept Kant's view that
duties to animals are only indirectly duties to them, and are directly duties to one-
self, then the discussion should fall in the Tugendlehre.
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On the other hand, the sorts of duties we are alleged to have to nonhuman
animals, even if only indirectly, are duties such that, were they duties t~ oth~r
humans, would fall within the range of law or Recht. Cruel treatment of amm~s IS
presumably comparable to assault or related fonus of mistreatment if it were dlrec·
ted at humans, e.g., those forms of mistreatment involved in torture, starvation or
false imprisonment of the most severe sorts. And indeed, as mentioned abov~,
many European and American jurisdictions have had laws against cruelty t~ am·
mals for many years. So when such duties are regarded as direct, they are pn~ar·
ily legal duties to others, in relation to which there would also be correspondmg
rights. The fact that animals are no position to complain of bad treatment to a court
is no more a reason for thinking they cannot have rights against such treatme~1
than it is a reason for thinking an abused patient suffering from senile dementIa
could have no such rights. In both cases when there are such abuses others may
1 ' , , evision tocomp am to a court representing the victim as a surrogate. There IS a r .'
the Kantian framework of Recht that such a view forces: we would now have mdl-
viduals, whether nonhuman animals or incompetent hopeless humans, who are I~
be regarded as having rights but no duties. The complete symmetry of rights an
duties that is presently a feature of Kant's Rechtslehre views will be lost.
UT • I h gh this
vve can thmk that Kant might believe that only humans have sou s, t ou If
is no part of his doctrine. Souls are not observeable or scientifically detectable, I
't h . sed sous,I were some ow known that only humans and no other ammals posses
then we would have a sharp distinction of kind between humans and nonhum~
animals. Alternatively, this sharp distinction may in Kant's view be based on his
l' h h es along
c aim t at umans possess freedom or autonomy _ a capacity that com
'th ' I' d t It mayWI ratIOna Ity and moral capabililty _ and that nonhuman animals 0 no '
be reasonable to say that if we wish to soften Kant's sharp distinction between
humans and nonhuman animals, we would have to revise Kant's theory of fr~e­
do K ' ' lternatIvem. ant s VIews on human freedom present a major obstacle to an a ,
theory of duties to animals that we could still call "Kantian " For example, van
ous
'b r . . ffree-
compatI a 1st theones of freedom and responsibility may allOW for degrees o. I
dom and 'b'l' d' m anllna S
. responsl I lly, and merely assign typical humans and para Ig 'e we
dIfferent. places on the same scale. Within this partially Kaotian altemauv th y
would vIew nonhu d' . . h because eman para Igm ammals as creatures that had fig ts, . dU-
have "sakes" [S d' . f havlOg
, ,ee ISCUSSlOn of Feinberg below] but are incapable 0 h t
tIes, because they la k th . h freedom I a
. . . c . e ratIOnal capacities, and perhaps also t e . kind
havmg dutIes entaIls. StIlI, they can be viewed as not radically different 10
from humans.
Now I want to sk t h h an animalsth t· . e c a way of looking at humans vis a vis non um , I than
K
a ~s much .more empirical, inductive, and less a priori and metaphyslCa van-
ant s Own VIews Th' I . non l"
t
' . IS argument or perspective could also be usefu In a "roll-
Ian context and as s h . it the "'10
ments l' ' • • uc mIg t be at least the beginning of a rep Y 0 oeS as
lor ammal nghts' h It gfollows: presented by Smger and Regan, among ot ers,
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We look at the world around us and observe the behavior of various bodies, in
particular bodies that are animal organisms. Based on such empirical evidence in-
ductively marshaled, we could say that we know of no cases where nonhuman
animals possess the skills of personhood: speech, behavior suggesting the possibi-
lity of moral and motivational autonomy, etc. On the other hand most human
beings possess such capabilities. So an important piece of evidence toward draw-
ing conclusions about individuals having rights and / or duties would be that the
individual has human parents and is a living member of the human species, Homo
sapiens. Now we know that some human individuals have always lacked or come
to lack characteristic human abilities. When we observe such a lack in particular
humans, we have an additional question of whether the attainment or recovery of
Such human potential may still be possible. It seems that sometimes it is, and
sometimes it is not. We expect that most newborn humans will eventualIy attain
full human capacity, given favorable opportunities for development (which it is
therefore obligatory to provide). In other cases we must be more pessimistic (e.g.,
Alzheimer's syndrome). Again, we also observe that there are no cases where non-
human animals, even those in our paradigm, attain such capacities. So it is induc-
tively reasonable to regard all of those with human ancestry, who are therefore
specimens of Homo sapiens, as fully persons, with the rights entailed by that status
and to regard none of those with nonhuman ancestry as persons. And it may even
be regarded as reasonable to regard all those with human ancestry as persons even
in the face of strong evidence to the contrary. For it would be deeply troubling to
withdraw such a status from certain humans; doing so would raise the question
about whether we might do the same with respect to other humans, for reasons
good or not so good. Some might seek to exclude those of other races or religious
beliefs from such rights-protection., which I take it would be bad reasons. So spe-
cies membership is an important marker for an individual's having the complete
package of human rights.
We might mention as another example that broadens the scope of rights that
human individuals, having once been recognized as competent persons, may have
rights to dispose of their property even after death, through the mechanism of the
will. I recognize that wills are not necessarily to be interpreted as rights that are
?iven to the dead, that is, as rights that reach beyond the grave. If there are oth~r
Interpretations, then wills do not provide a clear and unambiguous ex~m~le. ~ut If
we understand Wills in this way, and hence find the legal system asslgnmg nghts
even to the dead, then by a parity of argument some rights might also be extended
to living nonhuman animals. The main point in this discussion is that ancestry and
hence species membership can be reasonably regarded as providing strong pre-
sumptions of being bearers of rights.
One of the things that humans and nonhuman animals have in common is inter-
et · . I .. k "s in "I did
. s s. r as Joel Feinberg refers to them in an influential artlc e, sa es, a . "
It for her sake." {Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Un~orn Gene~tlons ,
pp. 159-185 in Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty, Pnnceton: Princeton
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University Press, 1980.) Humans and animals have obvious preferences opposed to
being too hot or too cold, against having their bodies penetrated by knives or bul-
lets, against hunger, and on and on. Plants and rocks cannot be said to have
"sakes" in the same way. Feinberg proposes that it is such sakes that give human
and nonhuman animals their rights, and hence he readily accepts the conclusion
that animals have rights - because they have sakes.
Arguably, for humans we extend rights even beyond their own sakes, as when
we continue to confer rights on human vegetables, the pennanently comatose. Per-
haps we do this merely for safety's sake, on the off chance that such an individual
might unexpectedly revive. And after all, major families of rights march along
with that human pedigree, as we said above.
This characteristic human "packet" of rights is regularly assigned to all "per-
sons," the word of art in the U.S. Constitution, where it generally means all hu-
mans within U.S. legal jurisdiction. [The Cambridge Kant translation renders
Kant's term Mensch as "person," and I believe this is the best translation.] The
post-civil war amendments in the U. S. Constitution do not refer to "citizens,"
though even so it is surely correct that citizens have certain additional rights, be-
yond those assignable to all persons, such as the right to vote. Kant himself ven-
tures into dividing up the human packet of rights, as we might call it, when .h.e
distinguishes active from passive citizens. [MS, VI: 314-5] Merely passive clU-
zens lack the independence of property owners, males, and adults. Kant could ha~e
added the demented, the severely retarded, and the comatose to those reduced 0
passive citizens. Kant's distinction inspires outrage, first because the category of
passive citizens is said to include all women, and secondly because the propert~­
less are excluded from active citizenship. In an era when women were almost unI-
versally excluded from full participation in society, and propertyless persons
lacked the independence requisite for a full citizen (particularly in an era bef~~
the secret ballot), and were arguably merely creatures of others, perhaps they I
lack the requisites of active citizenship. However, the objection is not that ~ant
makes the distinction between active and passive citizens, but that he extends 11 to
these two classes it should not be extended to. It is surely reasonable, for example,
to regard children as passive citizens. Perhaps the main exclusions thought of un-
der the "passive" category are exclusions from governing, including voting, and
serving as officers of government. Even though women in Kant's day were also
excluded from most professions, it seems less certain whether in Kant's sche~e
this is a cause or an effect of his declaring them passive citizens. It is surely unfair
to exclude the propertyless and all women because society has already placed
them in a disadvantaged position, and then proposes to take other rights from them
because of those disadvantages. My point is not to defend Kant's views here, but
to say the objections to it come from his overbroad use of the distinction, not the
distinction itself, which does have some proper exemplars.
The point about passive citizens seems to be that they are individuals unsuited
tf" . f' de-o unctlOnmg as full CItizens, that is, as adequately autonomous sources 0 Jll
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pendent decision making (voting). This is certainly the case with respect to young
children. One might argue in response that as a practical matter some women, even
though they live only a domestic and almost no public life, are more dominating,
independent, and autonomous than some men, and the same goes for some unpro-
pertied as opposed to propertied individuals among otherwise competent adult
males. Again, I have no wish to defend Kant against such points.
But the point I want to get to is that within a Kantian scheme it may be reason-
able to regard nonhuman paradigm animals as like passive citizens, though they
may be somewhat more passive than even young children - and that mainly be-
cause most young children are future fully competent adults. Kant surely regarded
young children and women as protected by such laws as those against assault and
theft and false imprisonment. Now animals may not be protected against theft,
since they cannot be legal holders of property, or false imprisonment, since they
arguably have no general right of freedom, and perhaps not even against being
"enslaved" (e.g., as a plow horse) or slaughtered for human use. To some extent
the fact that they lack such rights may be the result of the fact that the range of
"sakes" that operate in their lives to determine their rights are significantly more
limited than that of most humans. For example, it seems to me plausible, though I
cannot argue it here at length, that death is a different sort of evil for nonhuman
animals, and so is neutering, and neither is as great an evil for nonhuman animals
as for humans. The former would be true because animals do not fear or anticipate
death as humans do, the latter because neutering does not mutilate and misshape
the life of the neutered animal as it does a human life. These views, I admit, are
controversial, and would need a more extended discussion for an adequate de-
fense. Here I will only comment that our feelings about castration have become so
strong that we are willing to deny ourselves what has often been reported to be the
magnificent experience of hearing a castrato sing, and that we are also willing to
~eny freedom to the rapist who is willing to lose his testicles in exchange for gain-
Ing his freedom. [We also deny would be castratos the opportunity for a potentially
fUlfilling career.] Children are dependent upon their parents and guardians, and
perhaps in similar fashion so are nonhuman animals, though in the case of both
categories questions arise about whether individuals in each group may be appro-
priately "used" for the exclusive benefit of those who have charge of them, and
Without reference to their own future benefit. We are surely less willing to judge it
right to give over the entire lives of children to the benefit of their guardians than
We are in the case of nonhuman animals but it seems doubtful that this difference
is Sufficient to sustain anything close to 'Kant's more absolute distinction between
those creatures who are bearers of rights and those who cannot be.
So I conclude, somewhat tentatively, that within a mostly Kantian frame.work
We may indeed recognize that paradigm nonhuman animals are bearers of nghts,
against Kant's own explicit views to the contrary. The alternative Kantian frame-
Work proposed here would be one where there was not an absolute distinction
between human freedom and animal lack of freedom. It would be one in which
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we were willing to look at the behavioral evidence of human and nonhuman ani-
mal behavior, which is an approach probably more empirical than what Kant was
used to.
Yet such a conclusion is or at least seems to be a startling one that will cause the
reader steeped in the Kantian philosophical framework considerable uneasiness.
Such a conclusion seems against the grain of the main ways of thinking in Kant's
ethics. It may be said that it is a deep matter that for Kant ethical concerns are
limited to relations between or among human beings (duties to others), or between
a human being and his own nature as such (duties to oneself). It can be urged
against me that both terms of the ethical relation in all such cases within a properly
Kantian framework will be anchored by a human being, and nonhuman animals
are altogether inappropriate place holders here. Without making a complete rerply,
I can note the following points:
(l) The resistance some feel to this position may be based on the deep cultural
background of Kant's ethics, according to which humans have immortal souls
capable of salvation and animals do not. But this is not explicitly a part of
Kant's doctrine.
(2) There is further the fact that if we allow that animals may not be the relational
endpoints of duty-right relations, then we have problems with less thanfully
competent humans also being excluded in ways we presumably do not WIsh to
do. This problem is mitigated but not eliminated by my earlier suggestion th~t
we take membership in the human species through descent seriously, since It
makes such a major difference in the likely potential for any individual, and
such potential is central for determining the rights-bearing status of such an
individual.
(3) But perhaps my main point here is that even if Kant did not, we, as we attempt
further to develop a Kantian ethics today, should think much more in termS of
human solidarity with paradigm nonhuman animals. Such solidarity is most
likely simply a post-Darwinian viewpoint, one that comes much more natu-
rally and easily in the wake of Darwin's claim that we and the apes and indeed
. 's
all other forms of nonhuman animal life have common ancestry. DarwIn
theory was one that Kant could never have known of, just as he could ne~er
have known of the later developments of non-Euclidean geometries and Em-
" h' h ." ofsteIman p ySICS, that impacted his views in the "Transcendental Aest eUC ..
the Critique of Pure Reason. This commonality becomes tempered and mlU-
gated as the similari~ies with respect to capabilities become less, that is, as w~
~ompare humans WIth bonobos, macaques, pigs, doves, fish, octopuses, an
Jellyfish, but it never disappears. The most important commonality is the ex-
pe~ence of pain and the possibility of suffering. It is this fact that provides the
basIS for most of our (direct) duties to animals. Pain and suffering may be e~­
perienced at their most intense by humans, but the capability for both still ~nI­
tes every sort of creature for a long ways down the great chain of animal hfe,
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if I am still permitted to use such an expression in this post-Darwinian time. If
nonnal adult humans are centers of inherent dignity and value, which agents
morally must take into account in calculating their direct duties to others, then
so also must be paradigm non-human animals.
Zusammenfassung
Kant behauptet, daB wir nur indirekte Pflichten haben konnen, von Grausam-
keiten und Gewalt gegen Tiere abzusehen. Ptlichten dieser Art seien direkte Ptlich-
ten gegen uns selbst, urn unseren moralischen Charakter nieht zu verderben, aber
konnten nieht direkte Ptlichten gegeniiber den Tieren sein, weil Tiere keine ratio-
nalen Wesen sind. Diese Sichtweise erscheint unbefriedigend, da die Tiere die
Opfer einer solchen MiBhandlung sind, wenn sie stattfindet, und die Vorstellung,
daB wir keine direkten Ptlichten ihnen gegeniiber haben soIlen, erscheint merk-
wiirdig. Ich pladiere dafiir, daB Kant, durchaus in Ubereinstimmung mit seiner all-
g~meinen Moralphilosophie, batte ein Konzept von direkten Ptlichten gegeniiber
Tleren entwiekeln konnen. Ein solches Konzept ware weitaus plausibler und batte~ant geholfen, mit alWmigen Problemen umzugehen, die sich im Hinblick auf
dl~ Behandlung von zurechnungsunfiihigen Personen ergeben, die ebenfalls keine
ratlonalen Wesen sind, sondern allenfalls potentiell. Zwar kann Kant durchaus
plausibel machen, daB es die von ihm behaupteten indirekten Pt1ichten im Hinblick
auf Tiere gibt, aber nieht, daB unsere Ptlichten gegeniiber Tieren auf derartige in-
direkte Pt1ichten beschrankt sind.
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